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or its contribution “to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and 
human rights in Europe” over six decades the European Union has been awarded the 
2012 Nobel Peace Prize. This is a magnificent honour and a much-needed boost for an 
integration project that is bedevilled by economic crisis and deep-seated political and social 
unrest.  The  Norwegian  Nobel  Committee’s  decision  could  be  interpreted  as  a  signal  to 
breathe new life into the EU enlargement agenda, indisputably the Union’s peace project par 
excellence. 
What  started  out  as  a  post-World  War  II  project  to  pacify  erstwhile  rivals  France  and 
Germany has pushed the boundaries of the zone of peace outwards so as to embrace almost 
the  entire  continent.  It  has  seen  the  incorporation  of  post-dictatorial  Greece,  Spain  and 
Portugal, and the re-unification with post-communist Central and Eastern Europe.  
But the accession of Bulgaria and Romania has taken the Schwung out of the EU enlargement 
process and cast doubt on the strength of its transformative power. Accession talks with 
Turkey have ground to a halt, despite the Commission’s efforts to launch a positive agenda. 
For  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  pre-accession  conditionality  also  fails  to  inspire;  successive 
‘progress reports’ by the European Commission read as ‘stagnation reports’. And for the 
fourth year running, the Council has been held back by Greece from taking a decision on 
opening accession negotiations with (the Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia until the 
dispute over the country’s official name is resolved. 
This issue is emblematic of a ‘creeping nationalisation’ in the enlargement process, i.e. the 
imposition of bilateral conditions by individual member states upon candidate countries. 
Other cases in point are the conditions set by Slovenia upon Croatia over, among others, the 
demarcation of maritime borders, and the demands placed on Iceland by the UK and the 
Netherlands to reimburse savings lost during its banking crisis. 
The sovereign debt crisis and the threat of financial collapse of some EU member states have 
triggered  fierce  debate  about  the  economic,  social  and  political  finalité  of  the  Union  and 
curbed the appetite for further enlargement. The crises have also fuelled debate in the UK 
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about its future role in the EU and strengthened the resolve of countries like Switzerland and 
– ironically – Norway to stay outside of the Union. 
Apart  from  the  brief  burst  of  enthusiasm  that will  likely  accompany  Croatia’s  imminent 
accession, ‘enlargement fatigue’ is here to stay within the EU, especially in light of widely 
held  perceptions  that most  of  the  (potential)  candidate  countries  are  hampered  by  small 
economies, weak administrations and corrupt law-enforcement authorities. Indeed, it is not 
surprising the EU’s general public is somewhat puzzled by the Commission’s suggestion to 
open  negotiations  on  a  Stabilisation  and  Association  Agreement  with  Kosovo,  on  whose 
status  EU  member  states  maintain  different  views.  Similarly,  the  granting  of  candidate 
country status to Serbia, a country whose political leaders’ antics recall a dark past, and the 
opening of accession negotiations with Montenegro, despite its long tradition of corruption 
and organised crime, are decisions that elicit incomprehension.  
Adding  to  this  sombre  picture  is  the  ‘pre-accession  fatigue’  of  the  candidate  countries 
themselves. With the image of the EU as a latter-day Eldorado fading, the political leaders of 
these countries may well be wondering what they are getting themselves into. Some have 
even  declared  the  Union’s  current  woes  “the  end  of  the  EU  dream”.  Whereas  EU 
membership  is  still  their  strategic  objective,  the  adoption  of  EU  values  and  standards  is 
primarily understood as a means to the end of modernising their countries. Yet, the EU’s 
demands for continuous reform have begun to ring hollow, especially in the ears of political 
leaders who are calculating whether playing the card of (distant) EU accession will yield 
sufficient returns for them at the polls. Fake compliance with EU conditionality is often the 
result. Keeping up appearances may be politically and economically more advantageous in 
the short term, but is certainly detrimental to real progress in the longer run. Bulgaria and 
Romania are cases in point. Five years since it replaced pre-accession conditionality, the post-
accession ‘Cooperation and Verification Mechanism’ has not delivered the desired results in 
terms of judicial reform and the fight against organised crime and corruption.  
In  spite  of  the  European  Commission’s  rhetoric  (pushed  by  some  EU  member  states)  to 
pursue an ‘AAA’ enlargement policy (‘strict but fair’, ‘first the red lines then the red carpets’, 
‘first the performance then the applause’), lessons drawn from previous enlargement waves 
have yet to be put into practice. The country that is next in line for accession seems to be 
afflicted by the same malaise as those that entered the Union in 2007, albeit to a lesser degree: 
Croatia’s reform of the judiciary continues to be subject to ongoing monitoring in the period 
between conclusion and full ratification of the Accession Treaty. It is has been recognised 
that Chapters 23 (rule of law and human rights) and 24 (justice, freedom and security) were 
(again) opened too late in the accession negotiation process. Seen from this perspective, the 
decision to start with these most difficult chapters in the accession talks with Montenegro 
should be welcomed. The introduction of benchmarks in accession negotiation procedures 
and a greater focus on the performance track record (implementation and enforcement of 
approximated laws) should overcome some of the current setbacks affecting EU enlargement 
conditionality. 
Presenting the 2012 enlargement package, Commissioner Stefan Füle said: 
Our  recommendations  place  the  rule  of  law firmly  at  the  centre  of  the  accession 
process. To create a more stable and prosperous Europe, momentum needs to be 
maintained both for the merit-based enlargement process on the EU side and for 
reforms on the ground in the enlargement countries.  
However, a major flaw of accession conditionality has been the vagueness with which the EU 
has attempted to flesh out some of the key pre-accession criteria. This is particularly evident 
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democratic governance and the rule of law? As far as the ‘rule of law’ is concerned, there is 
hardly any firm acquis to establish whether the criterion has been met. The EU relies mainly 
on Council of Europe conventions, Strasbourg jurisprudence and reports from the Venice 
Commission.  The  Commission’s  renewed  focus  on  the  rule  of  law  as  one  of  the  central 
narratives  in  the  enlargement  strategy  posits  that  good  governance  is  not  about  rubber-
stamping laws but about establishing a performance track record. Arguably, this concerns 
only one aspect of political stability.  
The interpretation of what the economic pre-accession criterion entails fares much better. 
Yet, whereas the definition of what constitutes a market economy is clear, the Commission’s 
push  for  structural  reforms  in  this  area  appears  too  soft.  Moreover,  here  too,  many 
negotiating benchmarks are set by individual member states in order to protect their own 
industries and markets. From the EU’s perspective, one may wonder to what extent these 
bilaterally  imposed  conditions  undermine  the  negotiating  mandate  of  the  European 
Commission. For (potential) candidate countries, however, the list of conditions is long and 
seemingly non-exhaustive.  
Finally, and most tellingly, it is unclear what is meant by the ‘absorption capacity’ of the EU. 
Does  this  final  Copenhagen  criterion  concern  institutional  aspects  of  the  EU,  budgetary 
aspects, the maintenance of a high level of competitiveness all over the Union, geopolitical 
interests of the EU and/or public acceptance in the member states? 
If its enlargement policy is not to degenerate into a farce, the EU should refrain from offering 
diluted  forms  of  candidate  status,  such  as  the  one  extended  to  Albania  in  the  strategy 
adopted  on  October  10th,  conditional  upon  completion  of  key  measures  in  the  areas  of 
judicial  and  public  administration  reform  and  a  revision  of  the  parliamentary  rules  of 
procedure. Similarly, the EU should resist calls to lower the bar in accession negotiations so 
as not to lose candidate countries in the process (e.g. by compromising on Chapter 3 on 
financial  services).  The  European  Commission  therefore  needs  to  find  new  ways  to 
consolidate  the  enlargement  agenda,  gain  full  support  of  the  member  states  for  its 
implementation  and  assure  a  consistent  application  of  the  pre-accession  requirements. 
Arguably, more time, more money and greater expertise are needed to pursue the vocation 
recognised by the Nobel Committee.   